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Abstract: The doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a hugely 
consequential one in the contemporary world, appearing to grant nation-states 
both jurisdiction-type rights and rights of ownership over the resources to be found 
in their territories. But the normative justification for that principle is far from clear. 
This article elucidates the best arguments that might be made for permanent 
sovereignty, including claims from national improvement of or attachment to 
resources, as well as functionalist claims linking resource rights to key state 
functions. But it also shows that these defences are insufficient to justify permanent 
sovereignty, and that in many cases they actually count against it as a practice. 
They turn out to be compatible, furthermore, with the dispersal of resource rights 
away from the nation-state which global justice appears to demand.    
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the river…came flowing in a semicircle crossing the border from 
Sweden and down through this village and back into Sweden a few 
kilometres further south. And I remembered the year before when I 
had gazed down into the whirling water and wondered whether in 
some way or other it was possible to see or feel or taste that the 
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water was really Swedish and was only on loan this side of the 
border. But I was so much younger then and didn’t know much 
about the world, and after all it was just a fancy.1 
 
It might be fanciful to suppose, as Per Petterson’s young hero does, that water 
flowing from Sweden tastes somehow Swedish. But though we can be sure that the 
water, or tin, or copper found in Sweden are no different in their properties from the 
water or tin or copper found in Norway, there is one sense in which they are 
‘Swedish.’ They are Swedish in the sense that international law defines them as the 
preserve of the Swedish people. A number of instruments of international law 
stipulate clearly and unambiguously that natural resources are at the ‘disposal’ of the 
nation-states ‘in’ or ‘under’ which they exist. The United Nations’ (1966) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for instance, states that ‘All 
peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources.’2  
 This doctrine, which has come to be known as the doctrine of ‘permanent 
sovereignty’ over natural resources, is a powerful organising principle within world 
politics. Although we might make the mistake of assuming it to be a natural fact of a 
world of states, the principle only came to be elaborated and enshrined within 
international law during the 1950s and 60s, when it was a highly controversial part of 
the struggle for decolonisation. Whilst many newly-independent countries were keen 
to institute a strong doctrine of permanent sovereignty into international law, major 
world powers were keen to restrict permanent sovereignty with a set of provisos 
ensuring that natural resources were used for the wider good, and in the interests of 
global economic cooperation.3 Still, the principle continues to have a major effect in 
constituting what we might call the status quo of the contemporary world order. 
Individual nation-states enjoy an extensive and essentially exclusive set of rights over 
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the resources within their territories, albeit with exceptions to that rule arising 
through voluntary treaty-making. 
 In a pragmatic sense, then, permanent sovereignty is the default position: any 
argument for a particular distribution of resource rights will have to contend with the 
fact that states possess those rights as a matter of legal reality, and are unlikely to 
give them up easily. But ought it to be seen as the default position from the moral 
point of view? What, if anything, is the normative basis of permanent sovereignty? 
Can it be justified? This article will identify the best available arguments in favour of 
the doctrine, and assess whether they are adequate to the task of justifying it. Despite 
its huge significance within world politics, permanent sovereignty is not often 
explicitly justified within either international law 4  or political philosophy. Some 
defences do exist, as we will see later in this article. But the method will also be one of 
extrapolation, whereby we seek to identify whether defences of territorial rights over 
land, or of self-determination, for instance, could be extended to natural resources.  
The article begins in section I with some preliminaries, defining resources and 
resource rights, and distinguishing the question of rights over resources from the 
question of rights over land. Four arguments in favour of permanent sovereignty will 
then be adduced - and each, ultimately, will be found wanting. Section II examines 
whether nation-states have plausible ‘improvement’- or ‘attachment’-based special 
claims over ‘their’ resources. I establish that these two arguments fail to justify 
national permanent sovereignty. Although there are some improvement-based 
special claims which might apply at the level of nation-states, these apply to some 
resources and not to others, and moreover are best responded to by granting not full 
and exclusive rights over all of the natural resources within a territory, but an 
appropriate share of the income from the relevant resources. In the case of 
attachment, whilst there are again some plausible special claims within nation-states, 
these again fail to justify granting full and exclusive resource rights to them; such 
attachment-based claims apply to some resources and not to others, do not in any 
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case demand the full set of resource rights, and in many of the most plausible cases 
actually challenge, rather than support, the ability of the nation-state to exercise 
exclusive control over resources. 
 Section III then examines two rather more ‘instrumental’ arguments which 
might be advanced for placing resource rights in the hands of nation-states, each of 
which suggests that the doctrine of permanent sovereignty serves an important good 
(with the candidates being the good of members’ basic rights, and the good of 
effective conservation of resources), which would not be well served otherwise. The 
problem with these two arguments is that they are compatible with a regime of 
dispersed control over resources, and do not require or even recommend 
thoroughgoing permanent sovereignty. What is a powerful pillar of the contemporary 
world therefore turns out to stand without adequate justification. The conclusion 
draws some conclusions from this deficit for debates about global justice and 
territorial rights. 
 
 
I. Resources and Rights 
 
To make progress in investigating the justifications (if any) for permanent 
sovereignty, we need to know, first, what natural resources are, and, second, what it 
would mean to enjoy rights over them. This article defines natural resources as any 
raw materials (matter or energy) which are not created by humans, but are available 
to sustain human activities.5 This definition follows the usage within international 
law, and of international organisations overseeing trade in resources. For the 
purposes of compiling statistics on natural resources and economic growth, for 
instance, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development suggests that 
‘Natural resources are natural assets (raw materials) occurring in nature that can be 
used for economic production or consumption.’6  
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 Natural resources need to be distinguished from the land in, on or above 
which they occur. Though in practice this can be difficult, expensive and destructive, 
natural resources such as metals, petrochemicals and minerals can in principle be 
removed and transported away from the land in, on or above which they lie. 
Economic theory has not traditionally helped us much here insofar as its traditional 
list of the factors of production (land, labour and capital) included natural resources 
as a part of land. But more recently we tend to find the two separated more clearly 
both in economics and in the law, so that we witness instead discussion of ‘land and 
natural resources.’ The fact that natural resources are in principle removable from 
land means that we can intelligibly ask questions about whether rights over each 
should be allocated separately. In fact there is increasing recognition within political 
theory that rights over resources cannot simply be ‘read off’ from the territorial right 
to police a particular geographical jurisdiction, and that the standard justifications 
for rights of jurisdiction or border control cannot simply and immediately be 
extended to produce a justification for rights over resources. As David Miller puts it, 
in the absence of an argument why rights to exercise jurisdiction over territory, 
membership and resources need to be held together, ‘The relationship between the 
three sets of rights should be regarded as an open question.’ Each may require a 
separate, albeit potentially overlapping argument.7 
As a result it is possible – and desirable - to distinguish between indirect and 
direct claims to natural resources. A direct claim to a resource, on my account, is a 
claim which states that a specified agent has a prima facie claim to control, securely 
access or constrain others’ access to a specified resource simply because of some 
feature of her relationship with that resource (for instance, that secure access to that 
resource is in itself necessary to her ability to pursue her central life-plans; see below). 
An indirect claim to a resource, by contrast, is one which states that a specified agent 
has a claim to control, securely access or place constraints on others’ access to a 
resource but derives that claim purely from other, prior claims such as claims to 
6 
 
exercise control over land or over borders. Thus a person might say: I must be 
allowed to control resource x, or to be allowed to exclude others from accessing it, 
because use of resource x by others will harm the integrity of my land, or violate my 
(putative) right to regulate access to that land. Such indirect claims are rather a weak 
basis on which to ground claims to natural resources. For one thing, many natural 
resources (such as freshwater, fish, wild animals and possibly even oil) are not tied to 
a particular piece of land but are rather ‘fugacious.’ On the other hand, even claims to 
resources which are not fugacious are vulnerable to the challenge that if resource x 
could be removed without harming the integrity of the land (for instance, by some 
high-tech horizontal mining technology), any resource claims would then dissipate. 
By contrast a direct claim to a resource would remain intact regardless of whether 
and how others might access or extract it, and does not depend upon a close 
connection between resources and specific geographical sites. In section II I 
investigate national special claims which are direct in form, suggesting that nations 
are entitled to rights over resources because of some feature of their relationship with 
those resources. But it is also possible that nations, or states, might have good 
indirect claims to natural resources if it can be demonstrated that without that 
control other valuable ends would suffer. Section III considers two rather more 
indirect arguments which suggest that important political projects would suffer if 
states were denied rights over ‘their’ natural resources. 
 What, finally, would it mean to enjoy rights over a natural resource? Drawing 
on Elinor Ostrom’s influential work, I suggest a list of key resource rights. A first set 
of four includes the following: Access is the right to interact with a resource and to 
enjoy ‘non-subtractive’ benefits from it – benefits which, as with pure public goods, 
do not prevent anyone else enjoying the same right.8 Withdrawal is the right to 
obtain and indeed to remove resource units for one’s use, or to enjoy subtractive 
benefits. Alienation is the right to sell a resource. The right to derive income is the 
right to obtain proceeds from the sale of a resource, or to extract some other form of 
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income from it.9 All four rights in our first tier allow agents to derive benefits from 
resources. But we can also move up a level and delineate rights to qualify the ways in 
which such benefits can be enjoyed by others. A second tier of four rights includes the 
following: Exclusion is the right to determine who can access and withdraw a 
resource. Management is the right to set rules for how resources can be accessed or 
withdrawn, and conversely to make decisions about whether and how particular 
resources ought to be protected. The right to regulate alienation is the right to set 
rules about how rights over resources can be sold or otherwise transferred. The right 
to regulate income is the right to set rules about who can derive income from 
resources they have rights over, and how, and as such includes the ability to levy 
taxes on benefits. Taken together, subsets of these eight rights can capture the 
substance of what are typically called property rights over resources, and what might 
be termed rights of jurisdiction over them. 
The point to make immediately is that these rights are both conceptually and 
practically separable. We should not be misled into assuming that all these rights in 
some sense naturally cohere into a single and simple notion of ‘ownership,’ for 
instance. Honoré’s famous account of the incidents of property makes just this point 
very clearly. As he puts it, ‘Historically there have been many reasons for separating 
the standard incidents into two or more parcels. Indeed, historically speaking, the 
metaphor of splitting may mislead, for in some cases full ownership has been built up 
from the fragments, not vice versa.’ 10  Such fragmentation is not exceptional or 
aberrant. 11  Hence to ask ‘who owns natural resources?’ is certainly the wrong 
question, if that question misleads us into assuming that all of the various rights over 
resources must be concentrated in the hands of a single agent. That might be the 
outcome of an argument about resources but it ought not, at the risk of begging the 
question, to be its starting point.  
 Those preliminaries set the scene for what follows. We are looking, in this 
article, for arguments which might justify granting an extensive set of rights over 
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natural resources to individual nation-states. The arguments considered in the next 
section ground resource rights for nations directly on special claims which the 
nations in question putatively have over them, as a result of some feature of their 
relationship with ‘their’ resources. The arguments considered in section III seek to 
ground states’ permanent sovereignty in the (indirect) significance of control over 
resources for valuable ends such as the securing of citizens’ basic rights, or 
conservation. In each case I demonstrate that, even insofar as the arguments under 
review are good, they do not suffice to ground anything like a full and exclusive set of 
resource rights for nation-states. As such permanent sovereignty stands without good 
justification.  
  
 
II. Permanent Sovereignty and National Special Claims 
 
Given the relative scarcity of direct arguments for the principle of permanent 
sovereignty, one place to look for support would be erstwhile defences of control over 
land, to investigate whether these might generate plausible justifications for control 
over resources too. Whilst not all defenders of territorial rights over land explicitly set 
out their stall to defend rights over the resources under it, it is nevertheless possible 
that they provide the conceptual tools for doing so. A variety of nationalist theorists 
have placed their faith in a justification of national control over territory which 
focuses on the way in which nations or nation-states come to enjoy a particular kind 
of relationship with land.12 A first argument draws on ‘improvement’-based special 
claims, and suggests that national communities may have invested a good deal of care 
and work in a territory or its resources, and as such earned rights over that land or 
those resources. A second argument relies on the significance of ‘attachment,’ and 
suggests that the attachment which national communities come to form with land (or 
resources) is crucial from a normative point of view, and justifies granting nation-
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states extensive resource rights. Such accounts ground claims in the way in which the 
people, and land (and perhaps its resources), have become adapted to each other in a 
deep way. One variant emphasises economic value whereas the other emphasises the 
centrality of land or resources to national projects or identities; most nationalist 
accounts, perhaps, advance a combination of both arguments. We will inquire 
whether nationalist accounts of territorial rights can extend into the domain of 
resources, and provide a justification for a strong principle of control over resources. 
I will show that they do not.  
 
 
Improvement-Based National Claims 
 
Perhaps a special claim from ‘improvement’ might provide us with a reason why 
nations might be entitled to control the resources within their territories. 13  The 
argument will suggest that nations add value to natural resources over time, and that 
this value demands that we place control over those resources in the hands of the 
nation in question. We need to be able to say here, according to Miller, that a nation 
has done things to improve a territory (or its resources) which can be appreciated as 
improvements according to some universal criteria of material value; examples might 
include cultivating land, digging wells, draining malarial swamps, making land more 
productive, and so on.14  
 However it is unclear, for three major reasons, whether such an argument can 
provide solid backing for anything like the doctrine of permanent sovereignty. First, 
even insofar as the improvement of resources occurs, it is not obvious that it makes 
sense to attribute this to the national community itself. We might object to such a 
claim on the basis that the national community is an inappropriate agent to which to 
attribute praise or blame. 15  But even if we could surmount that issue, it is not 
empirically obvious that improvement of resources coincides with membership of a 
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particular national community. As is well known, China has pursued a relentless 
policy of buying up the natural resources of many African countries, many of which 
were previously unappropriated. It is not clear what improvement-based claims those 
African countries would then be able to make. They have certainly sold exploration 
rights to Chinese companies, but pointing to that fact to justify their possession of 
resource rights in the first place can only beg the question. Much more generally, in a 
global economy the extraction and refining of natural resources is frequently the 
preserve of multinational corporations which employ people in many countries, may 
pay taxes in another country and dividends to shareholders in still further countries. 
In very few countries indeed is ownership of natural resources by foreigners actually 
forbidden, and in the rest the overlap between improvement and national 
membership will be patchy at best.    
 Second – and notwithstanding the first objection - improvement-based 
special claims will be troubled by the fact that the degree of ‘cultivation’ of resources 
is very variable.16 Some resources have indeed been improved or protected, but others 
have not. For instance, some resources will be undiscovered, and it is hard to see how 
any direct special claims could apply to them. Others will, like freshwater, literally fall 
from the sky or (often) flow from sources in other countries.17 Still others will lie 
dormant, and will not have been improved in any significant sense. In the case of 
minerals or petrochemicals buried beneath the ground, it is questionable just what 
the nation has done to earn an entitlement to them.18 Even if the costs of discovery 
and extraction might justly be recouped, this will still leave a substantial portion of 
value – or ‘resource rent’ – which is not created by the national community in 
question. Why, then, would there be any improvement-based claim over that value?19  
Perhaps, in attempting to make that view plausible, our defender of 
permanent sovereignty might suggest that whereas the national community does not 
actively contribute to the creation of that value, it may still do so more passively. For 
instance, we might say that the market value of a buried resource could be increased 
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simply by a decision not to exploit it, when others do exploit theirs. That decision not 
to exploit is after all a decision in its own right. But resorting to such arguments is 
risky for two reasons. For one thing the argument runs the risk of circularity, in 
grounding a right to control resources on the fact that nation-states reserve the right 
to exploit or not exploit those resources. The fact that a nation-state has excluded 
others from exploiting them can hardly justify the right to so exclude them. For 
another, the claim that nations might add to resources’ value just by leaving them in 
situ opens a very troubling can of worms, for by the same token other people outside 
of the nation will add to their value more or less passively too – one nation by 
desiring that good and hence increasing its market price; a further nation by 
possessing quantities of the same resource but not selling them. Miller, for instance, 
earlier pointed out quite correctly that ‘the value of the resources available within the 
territorial boundaries of any one state depend on global institutions such as the 
international commodity market.’20 At the very least, this suggests that nations might 
be entitled to part of the income from their resources, but that outside actors might 
also be so entitled. Unless we can establish that nations labour very directly over 
specific resources (which will not be true in many cases), that possibility is a daunting 
one.   
 The third and most significant problem is that even if the improvement-based 
argument generates a plausible national special claim over resources, it is far from 
clear that it should be responded to by allocating exclusive and full resource rights to 
nation-states. Observe here that in the first instance, according to Miller, it is the 
value added to a resource which the nation has a putative claim over, and not the 
resource itself: ‘the nation as a whole now has a legitimate claim to the enhanced 
value that the territory [or resource?] now has.’21 We might then ask why the correct 
response is not to allocate a quite specific form of resource right to nations, rather 
than the full complement of resource rights. In particular, we might, if we accepted 
the argument from the creation of value through to some kind of national entitlement, 
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accord nations a right to derive income: a right to a part of the proceeds should those 
resources be sold, or perhaps some other form of income. But it is not clear why they 
ought to be accorded any broader set of rights.  
 We need an argument, then, why improvement-based special claims – even 
insofar as they are good - need to be met by giving particular nation-states a full set of 
exclusive resource rights. In particular, even if nations did have property-like claims 
over the resources in their territories we would need additional reasons for thinking 
that a regime of individual national jurisdiction was also necessary, as opposed to a 
global jurisdictional regime for instance. One reason for also invoking jurisdictional 
rights has recently been suggested. Miller has argued that according limited resource 
(or property) rights to a national community will not allow its members to securely 
reap the benefits of their labours, in the absence of more substantial rights of 
jurisdiction over resources. As he puts it, ‘If a group has added value to territory, its 
continued enjoyment of the value it has created will always be insecure unless the 
territory is controlled by political institutions that represent the group.’ 22  One 
nation’s ability to derive income from its oil, for instance, will perpetually be 
vulnerable to external agents’ decisions concerning the legitimate use and sale of that 
resource. If an outside actor can potentially change and change again the rules 
determining how, when and under what constraints income from resources will flow 
back to rightful recipients, then receipt of that income will be highly insecure. 
 The argument here appears to target rights of jurisdiction in addition to 
national property rights. However, Miller’s argument is not sufficient to establish that 
a nation ought to enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over ‘its’ natural resources. In the first 
instance, observe that the argument only stipulates that some agent should be given 
stable jurisdiction over resources, and that we should be able to construe this agent 
as a representative of the nation which purportedly owns a resource. This argument 
does not give us any reason why this should be a single agent, or if so why that single 
agent should be the nation in question. A Kantian might say, for instance, that rights 
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over objects such as natural resources are never ultimately secure until the civil 
authority of states is nested within a cosmopolitan international order. If what we are 
after are stable and just rules of property, then we ought to commit ourselves to the 
emergence of such an order. Alternatively we might argue, on the basis of an interest 
in the good governance of resources (see section III), for a dispersed multi-level 
system of proprietorship over resources. If that system also upheld generally stable 
rules on resources, and adequately represented those who had created value, there 
would again appear to be no objection. Short of a rebuttal of such possibilities, the 
case for exclusive national control has not been made.  
We can, in fact, turn Miller’s objection more forcefully against his own desired 
conclusion. If we accept that the nation ought, if it is to reliably benefit from its 
efforts, to exercise a share in jurisdiction over any resources within its territory, once 
we acknowledge (as Miller appears to) that the national community is only one of the 
agents capable of increasing the value of a particular resource then it becomes much 
less plausible to hold that this jurisdiction should be exclusively national. If the value 
of a given resource is the product of the efforts of nationals, non-nationals and / or 
participants in the ‘international commodity market’ then we have the question of 
how to secure any stream of income to which outsiders might be entitled. Exclusive 
national jurisdiction would appear to render outsiders’ claims ‘always insecure’ 
themselves, and specifically vulnerable to the whim of the local nation-state. A 
regime of shared jurisdiction over resources, in which each party was appropriately 
represented, would appear to be optimal, other things being equal.23 
 
 
Attachment-Based National Claims 
 
Perhaps nations might be entitled to rights over their resources because they have 
integrated control over those resources into their collective life-plans, and come to 
14 
 
understand themselves as communities as collections of people who live in a close 
relationship with this forest or that gold-seam. Miller also suggests such an 
attachment-based argument for national resource control, noting that particular 
territories (and perhaps the resources within them) come to attain symbolic 
importance for nations as a result of their occupation of those territories, symbolic 
value which may be ‘valuable’ to them alone.24 I have suggested elsewhere that that 
the attachment-based argument for resource rights is often credible,25 and so rather 
than question the validity of attachment-based special claims themselves, I want to 
cast doubt on whether they can plausibly generate a claim for exclusive national 
control over all natural resources within a given territory. I will suggest that there are 
several reasons why this is highly unlikely.  
 The first is that the kind of strong and enduring attachment Miller appears to 
have in mind typically applies to a limited subset of resources, rather than to all 
resources within a territory. This suggests that if it applies to nations at all, the 
attachment-based justification will be patchy and uneven in its application. Simply 
put, there will be many other resources which simply do not figure in the national 
imagination in any significant way, and which are in fact relatively neglected. The 
logic of the attachment-based argument suggests that claims over such resources will 
also be lacking.  
 The second reason is that a strong and enduring attachment appears to be a 
quality of rather small-scale communities, rather than nations themselves. A good 
example might be the Saami people of Scandinavia: roughly sixty thousand members 
of an indigenous community which has sustained itself for more than a thousand 
years by herding reindeer. The task of feeding and herding reindeer dictates the 
movements of Siidas – small groups composed of several families – across the 
seasons. It provides an economic foundation, but also provides a shared cultural 
focus for that community. What we have in this case is a situation where there is an 
intimate and profound connection between an individual’s identity and its ability to 
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securely interact with a specific natural resource. Whilst all of us will have life-plans 
dependent on the availability of some natural resources (including, at the very least, 
the objects of our basic rights, such as clean air and drinking-water), some of our life-
plans demand secure access to specific natural resources. We don’t understand 
ourselves as fishermen or as hunters if there are no fish to fish, or no prey to hunt, 
and Saami people may not understand themselves as Saami people if they are denied 
secure access to ‘their’ reindeer herds. Now even in the Saami case it is an open 
question to what extent resource claims are weakened by the recent ‘modernisation’ 
of the semi-nomadic Saami existence (with reindeer-herding being transformed by 
the introduction of two-way radios, snowscooters and cross-country motorbikes), or 
by the gradual ‘Scandinavianisation’ of the Saami (with only an estimated ten percent 
of the community now engaging in herding, or dependent upon it for their upkeep). 
But otherwise the case looks like providing a plausible basis for attachment-based 
special claims over some resources. When we shift our focus to nations, though, it 
just does not seem possible to produce examples where a majority of the members of 
a given nation genuinely identify as part of that nation as a result of their direct 
relationship with specific natural resources.  
 Both reasons suggest that although attachment appears capable of generating 
good special claims over some resources, it appears highly unlikely to give us the 
argument for permanent sovereignty which is being sought. In fact it is worth 
returning to the concrete political implications of the Saami case, for it is not only the 
case that the specifics of the Saami case fail to transfer substantially to the national 
case. More worryingly than that, the Saami case threatens to actually challenge the 
case for exclusive national control over resources. It is worth pointing out that the 
rights of the Saami people – like the rights of indigenous peoples in many other parts 
of the world – are claimed against nation-states. The Saami community – like many 
indigenous communities (or ‘non-state peoples’) in the Americas – fail to map onto 
national boundaries. Rather, the Saami land – Sapmi – spans Norway, Sweden, 
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Finland and Russia (as do the reindeer-herds themselves, given their seasonal 
movements). Furthermore, although the logic of international law has often 
channelled the claims of indigenous people as though they were claims for something 
like permanent sovereignty over resources, their actual character has often been very 
different (and often much more limited). 26  Through forums such as the Saami 
Council27  the Saami people are able to campaign for equitable treatment across 
several countries, and during the Council’s membership of the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples it was able to voice an indigenous challenge to the principle of 
exclusive national control. In this context, rather than each country granting the 
Saami control over ‘its’ reindeer, in granting rights over reindeer and then allowing 
the Saami to move their herds freely across national borders it may be more accurate 
to say that each country has, often reluctantly, relinquished control over these herds. 
 The example of indigenous communities does supply, then, a case where a 
plausible claim for resource rights can be made – but in so doing it does not, typically, 
bolster the case for national resource rights. Indeed it may undercut it. The best hope 
for defenders of national control would presumably be to point towards truly national 
cases where the same very intense relationship between resources and communal 
identity can be identified. But it is not clear that such examples can be provided (and 
it is certainly the case that they have not yet been provided by defenders of national 
control). Rather, it appears likely that insofar as genuinely national attachment to 
resources exists, it will be both specific to particular resources, and also potentially 
satisfied by way of limited resource rights. Typical cases may include ones where 
there is a close connection between specific resources and parts of the landscape – 
where a specific kind of extractive industry, for instance, has played a key role in a 
nation’s socio-economic development, and where that development has clearly left its 
mark on the landscape. But such attachments could be respected by granting rights to 
access such sites, and perhaps rights to continue to derive some income from 
traditional industries of extraction or husbandry. It is not clear why they would 
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demand a full complement of resource rights, and it is far from clear that such 
arguments extend to all of the natural resources to be found within each national 
community. In sum, the attachment-based argument appears supremely unlikely to 
deliver good grounds for full resource rights over all of the resources within a nation-
state. It will be partial in both scope and content.  
 
 
III. Resource Control and the State 
 
Even if we consider the nationalist arguments canvassed in the last section to be 
unable to present nation-states with a full set of rights over all of ‘their’ natural 
resources, we might still try to defend that conclusion on other grounds. An 
alternative is to focus on the value of effective states. Perhaps states secure important 
goods for individuals, and perhaps it is the case that they are unable to secure those 
goods unless they are able to exercise effective ownership or jurisdiction over the 
resources within their territories. If we can demonstrate that states’ can advance 
important ends of justice, and also demonstrate that their ability to advance those 
ends of justice depends upon their having such rights, then we will have derived what 
could be called a ‘functionalist’ argument for resource rights.  I examine two kinds of 
functionalist argument in this section. The first would suggest that states are valuable 
(as well as legitimate) insofar as they protect the basic rights of their citizens, and 
that to enable states to protect basic rights in this way we need to accord them control 
over their resources. But in fact I will demonstrate that this position is compatible 
with quite limited control over resources, and certainly does not require anything 
approaching permanent sovereignty. The second argument would suggest that 
according control over resources to states (or Peoples, on Rawls’s account) produces 
the best outcomes in terms of the conservation and effective use of resources. But the 
evidence for this argument is very weak, and the good in question – here 
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conservation – turns out to be compatible – and likely more compatible - with a 
situation whereby rights over resources are dispersed across a range of institutional 
settings.  
 
 
Citizens’ Basic Rights and Permanent Sovereignty  
 
One potentially promising alternative to the nationalist arguments examined in the 
last section would be a ‘functionalist’ view, according to which states have a duty to 
meet the basic rights or needs of their citizens, a duty which in turn requires them to 
exercise control over the natural resources within their territory. Broadly speaking a 
functionalist account of territorial rights seeks to ground those rights on the way in 
which states serve the interests of their subjects. States, we might say, are necessary 
to ‘provide a unitary and public interpretation of the rights of individuals and to 
enforce those rights in a way that is consistent with those individuals’ continued 
freedom and independence from one another.’28 If we did not have states, individuals’ 
basic rights or needs would go without adequate protection. The important question 
though, for our purposes, is whether states’ ability to protect their citizens’ basic 
needs depends on full and exclusive rights over the natural resources within their 
territory.29  
 Cara Nine’s recent account of states’ resource rights grounds them precisely 
on the essential functions of states. Nine claims that a collective such as a state may 
acquire territorial rights if the acquisition ‘is necessary for the provision of members’ 
basic needs [and] does not prevent others from meeting their basic needs.’30 And 
giving a state rights over the natural resources within its territory is something that is 
necessary to ensure ‘secure access to the objects of members’ basic needs.’31  
 But even accepting as plausible the claim that a state which secures its 
members’ basic needs is (at least minimally) legitimate, the important question for 
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our purposes is just which rights over which resources are necessary to meet citizens’ 
basic needs. Here Nine’s position appears to have changed over time. At one point 
she argued that ‘a state [must] have exclusive territorial rights regarding the control 
of the natural resources within its borders.’32 The claim appeared to be that full and 
exclusive rights over natural resources (in short, permanent sovereignty) is simply a 
necessary element of self-determination.33 But it is questionable why we should think 
this, and indeed why we should favour any vision of self-determination which asked 
so much of us. After all, we can easily imagine regimes of mixed individual (including 
foreign), common and state ownership where the state reserved for itself key 
jurisdictional rights, regulated the extraction, exchange and expatriation of resources, 
and perhaps taxed owners at each stage, without claiming for itself the status of 
owner. It would be much too strong to suggest that such a state would not enjoy self-
determination. Notably, recent defences of national self-determination – such as that 
of David Miller, for instance – are not arguments for complete or rigid sovereignty 
over all internal affairs, and are compatible with the ad hoc transfer or power 
upwards to, for instance, confederal bodies; as a result, Miller suggests, ‘there is no 
reason to make a fetish out of national sovereignty.’34 Miller could be wrong about 
that, of course. But if he is, then he is in good company. Not only does his judgement 
accord with other recent theorists of self-determination,35 but it also accords with the 
broad redefinition of sovereignty post-World War II – with what is sometimes called 
the ‘human rights revolution,’ which sees sovereignty increasingly intimately tied to 
the observance of basic human rights. 36  It also accords with the growth of 
‘governance’ at the global and trans-national level, which sees a pooling of states’ 
authority to make decisions on a series of issues.37 In the case of natural resources, 
states have placed bounds upon their own authority by signing key international 
instruments, and joining key international organizations, governing the use of for 
instance fisheries, trans-boundary waterways, and hazardous chemicals.38 We have 
also witnessed the gradual emergence in international law of a set of duties 
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accompanying permanent sovereignty which, although at present rather weak, seek 
to constrain the ways in which states use natural resources. Examples include the 
duty to respect the rights and interests of indigenous peoples,39 the duty to equitably 
share trans-boundary natural resources, 40  and the duty to use resources 
sustainably,41 amongst others. Sovereignty over natural resources has not therefore 
been a static and absolute category, but one which has been constrained by the partial 
sharing of sovereignty over resources between states and by the parallel growth in 
duties under international law. 
 Nine’s more recent view is considerably more nuanced, insofar as it now 
allows quite significant constraints on states’ resource rights. Not only should we 
refuse their territorial claims over the ‘commons’ (such as the Arctic and Antarctic 
regions); but we should also refuse to grant states rights over the resources buried 
deep under their territories.  These are resources which, as I suggested in the last 
section, states appear to have done little or nothing to ground any claims over. 
Moreover, and more pertinently from Nine’s point of view, control over underground 
resources appears at best weakly connected to a state’s ability to exercise jurisdiction 
over a territory.42  
 But even if we accept Nine’s functionalist account, this is not the only 
qualification we should make. Recall that the functionalist account is grounded on a 
state’s ability to meet citizens’ basic needs (or as Stilz puts it, basic rights). But if the 
focus is properly on basic rights, then why not grant states control over precisely 
whatever resources are necessary to meet basic rights, rather than all resources 
within a territory? This challenge has two parts: why grant states rights over the 
resources within their territories, and not over some general pool of resources? And: 
why grant states rights to resources over and above those necessary to meet basic 
rights?  
What, then, of our first challenge? Are there any good reasons why states 
ought to be able to meet their citizens’ basic rights by using the particular resources 
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found within their own territories? If the functionalist account can give us an account 
of just why states should be entitled to those specific resources, then it might have 
achieved something significant. Unfortunately the argument for that contention is 
not entirely clear, at least insofar as functionalist accounts have thus far been 
developed. Perhaps the functionalist account might be supplemented with arguments 
drawn from the nationalist account. We might say, for instance, that insofar as 
improvement-based or attachment-based special claims overlap with state 
boundaries, the contention that states should enjoy jurisdiction over basic shares of 
their own resources is strengthened. But that would provide rather weak support 
because, as we have already established, it is not clear that special claims do overlap 
very neatly with state boundaries, and many of the most plausible attachment-based 
special claims appear to challenge, rather than support, exclusive state jurisdiction.  
With regards to the second part of the challenge, restricting state claims to 
those resources necessary to meeting basic rights – which the logic of the 
functionalist argument would appear to support - would potentially rule out rights 
over a large pool of resources. There may be some communities in which the minimal 
quantity of natural resources available is precisely sufficient to meet basic needs. But 
in many communities, there is an ‘excess’ (and often a very considerable ‘excess’) of 
resources which are not necessary for meeting basic rights. Why grant rights over 
these? On the other hand, there will be some communities in which the resources 
available are insufficient to meet basic rights. Here presumably the functionalist 
account would have to grant claims on other states’ resources, and in so doing limit 
the permanent sovereignty of those states. 
The functionalist account is likely to constrain states’ rights in other ways too. 
If what we are concerned about was the protection of individual rights then we might 
want to prevent states using resources in ways that damaged the basic rights of 
outsiders, for instance. But we might also suspect that the rights of individuals were 
likely to be best protected by a regime of dispersed and multi-level governance of 
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resources (see below). In principle there are a variety of institutions which could 
protect the basic rights of individuals, and simply stipulating that these rights have to 
be protected by a single agent – the state – would be indefensible. 
 Thus the functionalist account, in the end, appears to demand relatively little 
in the way of resource rights. The one thing it certainly does demand is an 
entitlement to the natural resources needed to meet citizens’ basic rights. But that is 
compatible with – and in cases of shortfalls in some states will demand – constraints 
on permanent sovereignty. And since no plausible account of justice will deny 
individuals the objects of their basic rights, the functionalist account here seems to 
have established very little.  
 
Conservation and Permanent Sovereignty 
 
We have already examined a functionalist account according to which states 
putatively derive resource rights from their mission to protect the basic rights of their 
citizens. But that is not the only functionalist argument possible. An alternative 
would focus on the way in which resources are used – efficiently or otherwise – and 
suggest that states ought to enjoy rights over resources because a system of 
permanent sovereignty will produce an optimal pattern of resource use. Such an 
argument might lean on the commonplace claim that assets (such as resources) will 
deteriorate in value unless they are ‘owned’ or controlled by a single, specified agent. 
John Rawls appears to lean towards more broadly functionalist arguments for 
territorial rights in The Law of Peoples, though not always in much explicit detail. 
But he certainly does suggest, at two points in that essay, that territorial rights might 
be justified via a parallel with property. Much as an asset ‘tends to deteriorate’ ‘unless 
a definite agent is given responsibility for maintaining it,’ so a government ought to 
take responsibility for a territory and for ‘maintaining the land’s environmental 
integrity.’43 The argument, as we might reconstruct it, suggests that we will endure a 
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‘tragedy of the commons’ unless specified parties are allocated an interest in 
conserving resources and their value.  
The structure of this argument is a plausible one: resource control on the part 
of individual states (or Peoples) serves an important good – effective conservation of 
resources – which would not be secured by any rival system. Like the functionalist 
argument from the basic rights of citizens, it places its faith in an empirical 
conjecture that such a regime of resource rights will reliably serve an end of justice. 
 As Rawls presents it the functionalist argument from conservation or efficient 
use is underdeveloped – it really does not progress beyond that initial parallel with 
property, the staple of liberal economic theory. Even so, however, there are already 
three points that we need to bear in mind about the argument as it stands. First, it is 
not obvious why we would take Rawls’s argument to support extending all resource 
rights to individual states. Elinor Ostrom’s pioneering work, for instance, has 
established that there are many examples of communal ‘proprietorship’ rather than 
ownership over natural resources in which resources are effectively and sustainably 
used and managed. In such cases the ‘proprietors’ of those resources enjoy rights to 
access and manage resources, along with some rights to withdraw from the common 
stock, but do not enjoy rights to alienate them or even necessarily to derive income 
from them. As such granting agents rights to sell or derive income from resources 
does not appear to be strictly necessary for them to have an incentive to use them 
wisely.44  
Second, the economists’ argument which Rawls picks up on is actually an 
argument for individual ownership, which is meant to establish its superiority over 
the inefficiency and wastefulness of state control. That argument standardly suggests 
that individual ownership is necessary for the retention and creation of lasting value, 
whereas communally-held assets will tend to deteriorate in value, at least relatively.45 
But Rawls actually appears to want to use that argument to justify something like 
communal ownership. Economists are unlikely to be convinced, as their view is 
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precisely that communal ownership is insecure in its benefits. Indeed if at the global 
level assets are already owned and looked after by individuals, then as far as the 
economists are concerned the problem may be a non-problem. Why then (as far as 
they are concerned) stipulate a need for national control? None of this is to say that 
the economists are right; but it is to say that it is far from obvious how Rawls can 
support his own argument by leaning on evidence which is usually held to serve the 
opposite conclusion. 
Third and most importantly, even if we reformulate the argument to suggest 
that the optimal use of resources will come once we grant exclusive rights over them 
to individual states, what is the evidence for that contention? To an environmental 
scientist, the claim that the optimal basis for securing the best use of precious and 
scarce resources was a regime of untrammelled state control would presumably be 
alarmingly anachronistic. Moreover, although Rawls’s Law of Peoples depicts a world 
of potentially autarkic states which are free to choose whether to engage with the 
global marketplace or not, in reality it is a stubborn fact that states are already 
comprehensively dependent on the natural resources of other countries. The UK, for 
example, has fed its population for at least two hundred years only by supplementing 
its own production with foodstuffs produced overseas, demanding amongst other 
things vast quantities of freshwater for their production. It is not clear whether it 
could sustain anything like its present population without access to other states’ 
freshwater. Four countries, in fact - the US, Australia, Canada and Brazil - are 
currently engaged in a massive, though unplanned, transfer of ‘virtual’ water to the 
rest of the world without which shortages of water for food production would become 
disastrous very quickly. 46  We could make similar points about the reliance of 
countries on the rainforests of the Amazon and Congo regions, for example, in their 
capacity as key carbon sinks. Resource-cycles such as the global freshwater cycle or 
the cycle of carbon emission and absorption cannot, as we know very well, be 
controlled by individual nation-states, but they are indispensable to life as we have 
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come to know it. Fisheries policy appears to be a further case where the exclusive 
pursuit of national interests exacerbates, rather than eases, the tragedy of the 
commons Rawls is apparently concerned with, and where a sustainable future 
appears to demand greater transnational cooperation.47   
Thankfully there are instances of the trans-national governance of resources 
which have produced fairly robust advances. Prime examples would include the 
governance of fisheries, or of schemes aimed at the forest protection such as the 
International Tropical Timber Organization.48  Such schemes have proliferated to 
produce a mosaic of trans-national resource governance with overlapping jurisdiction 
and mixed – but nevertheless significant – degrees of success. Perhaps the most 
sustained and coordinated programme of trans-national resource governance has 
emerged under the auspices of the European Union. Although general conclusions 
are not easy to arrive at, it does seem to be the case that the EU has been 
instrumental in resolving – or at least mitigating – a series of collective action 
problems over resources. Whereas individual states have little incentive to adopt 
expensive principles of environmental regulation, the knowledge that like rules will 
be applied to all EU member-states makes them much more attractive.49 Insofar as 
exclusive national control can be an obstacle to resource conservation, 50  more 
complex forms of global and trans-national governance of resources have already 
delivered results - and, if we are to avoid the worst case scenarios of climate scientists, 
we have to hope that these are only the first of many such experiments in resource 
governance beyond the state.  
 In short, arguing for the superiority of permanent sovereignty as a guarantor 
of resource conservation or efficient use is far from straightforward. Rawls may have 
delivered a plausible argument to the effect that conservation of resources requires 
that specific parties are allocated an interest in their preservation. But he has not 
delivered the conclusion that this should be a single entity (or a single kind of entity, 
such as the state), or that the interest in the preservation of resources should or must 
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be concentrated at one level. It seems likely that if caring for the environmental 
integrity of resources is what we care about, then trans-national ‘proprietorship’ is at 
least part of an ideal solution. We could also draw support from the United Nation’s 
recent emphasis on developing policy frameworks for the management of what it 
designates Shared Natural Resources, such as water, which are held to be 
inadequately protected by a regime of primarily national control.51 In other cases, a 
degree of communal proprietorship at the sub-national level will also be preferable.52 
So whilst Rawls’s initial argument has a plausible structure, evidence for the 
conclusion that effective proprietorship over natural resources will always occur at 
the level of peoples or nation-states is weak. As with the broader functionalist 
account, the good of resource conservation would appear to be compatible with 
considerably qualified rights on the part of nation-states. Indeed we have good 
reason to suspect that from the point of view of conservation the dispersed 
governance of resources would be optimal. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In recent years discussion of the territorial rights of nation-states has come on in 
leaps and bounds. Several things have become obvious during this time. One is that 
defending states’ territorial rights is not easy, not least in the face of the claims of 
outsiders. To the contrary, if defending the interests of individuals is what we care 
about, granting states very firm territorial rights is a blunt instrument indeed.53 It 
may have been thought in the past that defending the territorial rights of states was a 
rather easy enterprise, but this is not the case any longer; and while the 
sophistication of defences of territorial rights is increasing, so too are the challenges 
they have to face becoming more apparent.  
27 
 
A second conceptual advance has been the recognition that the traditional 
elements of a state’s territorial rights – standardly comprising rights to exercise 
control of borders, to maintain jurisdiction over land, and to control resources – are 
not as tightly intertwined as was once thought. Each, potentially, requires a separate 
justification. This article has investigated the prospects for defending one element of 
a state’s territorial rights, as understood within contemporary international law. It 
has been suggested that defending permanent sovereignty over natural resources is 
fraught with difficulties. Arguments often advanced to defend control over land (such 
as nationalist arguments which, on my analysis, typically press special claims based 
on improvement and / or attachment) can be partially extended to cover resources, 
but do not take us even close to permanent sovereignty for nation-states. 
Functionalist arguments possess initial promise in presenting us with an account of 
how the rights of individuals cannot be defended without states enjoying some rights 
over resources (though, note, they do not necessarily tell us why there should be 
states as opposed to some other organisation or web of organisations). But they do 
not justify anything like permanent sovereignty either: their claims, even insofar as 
we ought to accept them, are much more easily satisfied. Functionalist arguments 
from conservation would tend to support a dispersal of resource rights away from 
nation-states, across a variety of institutional settings. Functionalist arguments from 
basic rights cannot rule that possibility out either – in fact if they take individual 
rights seriously they ought to endorse it. 
 I want to pause now to examine just where our discussion of arguments for 
permanent sovereignty leaves us, and to emphasise a rather striking fact about the 
argument so far. I have considered four arguments which appear to offer the best 
available justifications for permanent sovereignty, and found them wanting. As I have 
suggested, introducing special claims does not speak in favour of permanent 
sovereignty, but in favour of granting quite limited rights which in any case are at 
least partly orthogonal to any national claims. Similarly, taking citizens’ basic rights, 
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or conservation, seriously speaks in favour of distinctly limited rights for states, and 
suggests that constraints on states’ permanent sovereignty are both allowable and, 
indeed, required. 
 The striking fact – which more observant readers will have spotted – is that in 
so doing I have made no reference, in this article, to general claims to resources or to 
broader principles of global justice. I have not suggested that permanent sovereignty 
is unjustified because it denies individual equal – or equalizing – shares of resources. 
Neither have I asserted that resource distribution is morally arbitrary (which in any 
case is to put the cart before the horse if it means that we do not pay serious attention 
to special claims), and found arguments for permanent sovereignty accordingly 
wanting. 54  Neither, finally, have I invoked the spectre of bloody history, and 
suggested that permanent sovereignty is undermined by the facts of colonialism, 
resource grabs and the sheer historical brutality of the drawing of boundaries. Rather, 
I have examined each of the four arguments on their merits and shown, in each case, 
that following the logic of the argument leads us away from, rather than towards, 
exclusive permanent sovereignty over resources. Even without invoking wider claims 
of justice – even if improvement, attachment, the protection of citizens’ basic rights, 
or the effective use of resources is all that we care about – permanent sovereignty is 
found wanting.  
 But if we relax this – rather massive – constraint on the argument thus far 
and allow broader claims of justice their due weight, the sheer clumsiness of 
permanent sovereignty in serving justice becomes undeniable. A full account of how 
we ought to balance special and general claims over resources would require much 
longer treatment.55 But if our question is whether permanent sovereignty actually 
offers the best possible integration of special and general claims over natural 
resources, the answer is resoundingly negative. Permanent sovereignty does serve to 
protect a nation-state’s right to some of the income from resources which it has 
improved or protected – but only by the rather blunt measure of granting it a right to 
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all of the income from resources (and indeed all other rights over them), whether 
they have been improved or protected or not. It performs at best moderately well on 
the issue of attachment, and I have suggested that the strongest attachment-based 
claims relate to small-scale communities which in fact are often engaged in ongoing 
struggles to wrest resource rights away from the nation-state. At the same time, 
anyone outside of the national community who has developed a symbolic attachment 
to a given resource – a Canadian Hindu wishing to perform puja at the Ganges, for 
example – can be barred from accessing it at the whim of the local nation-state. 
Permanent sovereignty cannot be justified by pointing to the need to secure the basic 
rights of citizens, and the struggle to secure those rights must at least sometimes 
require us to place constraints on control over resources. Permanent sovereignty 
performs poorly in terms of conservation, and there is strong evidence that the 
optimal governance of scarce resources would see their management partially 
devolved both upwards and downwards from the state. Finally, and damningly, the 
regime of permanent sovereignty simply ignores the claims of outsiders, insofar as it 
restricts any benefits from resources to members of the nation-states in which they 
happen to lie.  
 In recent years key decisions and instruments of international law have 
increasingly emphasised the need to balance any claims to national control over 
resources with the interests of non-citizens and with the requirements of 
sustainability and intergenerational justice.56 The arguments of this article suggest 
that we ought to welcome such developments, and seek to extend them. Whatever a 
just regime of resource rights ought to look like, a doctrine of untrammelled 
permanent sovereignty must be an obstacle from rather than a boon from the point of 
view of justice.  
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